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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Sometime during September of 1978, Jerry Downs and Jerald
Greaves approached Mark McCracken with a proposal to purchase the
real property which is the subject of this action. (TR 15, 71,
72)

Mr. Downs at trial testified that he knew at the time that

the subject property was owned by Mark McCracken, his mother, his
uncle and aunt. (TR 71, 91, also TR 14-18)

Basic terms for the

purchase of the property were discussed and generally agreed
upon. (TR 23, 24, 71, 72)

At the suggestion of Mr. Downs, a

contract was prepared by Attorney Scott Barrett, who was
identified by all parties as an independent attorney to represent
all of the parties in preparing the document. (TR 20, 71, 72)
Mr. Barrett prepared a draft purchase agreement as well as draft
powers of attorney, which were subsequently picked up by Mr.
Downs and delivered to Mr. McCracken and his family for
signature. (TR 19, 73, 74, 108, 112)

On or about October 5,

1978, Kendrick McCracken and Lila McCracken executed that certain
Special Power of Attorney identified as Trial Exhibit 2, naming
Mark McCracken as attorney in fact for them. (TR 17-19, 21-22, 73
Exhibit 2)

On or about the 16th of October, 1978, Doris

McCracken executed a similar power of attorney identified as
Trial Exhibit 3. (TR 17-19, 21-22 Exhibit 3)

Thereafter on the

19th day of October, 1978, Appellant, Jerry Downs and Jerald
Greaves, and Respondent, Mark McCracken, individually and on
behalf of Kendrick McCracken, Lila McCracken and Doris McCracken,
executed that certain purchase agreement which has been
identified as Trial Exhibit 1 and which is the subject of this
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action for the sale and purchase of the Smithfield property. (TR
24-25, 74-77, 88, 122 Exhibit 1)
Mr, Downs requested Mr. McCracken to obtain the powers of
attorney from Mr. McCracken1s mother, uncle and aunt to
facilitate closing the transaction.

(TR 72 and 73)

After the

Purchase Agreement, (Exhibit 1) had been signed, Mr. Downs
delivered it to Western States Title Company with instructions to
have the matter recorded, which occurred on the same day. (TR 75,
76, Exhibit 1) The contract with the accompanying legal
description was recorded in book number 239 page 778 entry number
417846 of the official records of the Cache County Recorder,
identifying the contractual interest which Appellants claimed in
the subject property pursuant to the Purchase Agreement. (TR 110,
Exhibit 1)

Appellants purchased the Respondent's property for the

total sum of $180,000.00 with $500.00 paid down at the time that
the contract was executed, and the remaining balance of
$179,500.00 to be paid over time.

(TR 21, 22, 23, 26, 42,43, 76,

7 9, 99, Exhibit 1). The contract at paragraph 1 b provides as
follows:
"Buyers agree to pay an additional One Hundred and Seventynine Thousand and Five Hundred dollars ($179,500.00) in the form
of a Note secured by a deed of trust on the described property.
Said Note shall be payable in full on the first of September,
1983.

Provided, however, that, whenever buyers sell a lot or

portion of the described property, they shall pay one-half of the
gross sale price less real estate commission, if any, of said lot
to Sellers to apply on said note."
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(Exhibit 1)

All parties acknowledge that no promissory note or deed of
trust securing the same was ever executed or recorded. (TR 43,
84, 110, 120) No payment in the form of a note or otherwise was
made against the remaining balance of $179,500.00, except that
during the month of August and September of 1980, five
subdivision lots were sold and one-half of the proceeds was
delivered to the Sellers and applied against the outstanding
contractual balance.

(TR 119, 120) Once the contract was

executed, the Sellers had no further obligation whatsoever. (TR
77, 86, 87). Sellers had fully performed except to provide a deed
to the property upon payment of the outstanding balance or
execution of the note and trust deed.

(TR 33, 47)

Mr. McCracken

was ready willing and able to execute such a deed upon the
execution and'delivery of the note and trust deed specified in
the purchase Agreement.

(TR 32, 33, 47)

The record of title to the subject property reveals that in
July of 1978 Kendrick and Lila McCracken quit claimed to
themselves as trustees in trust of the Kendrick McCracken Family
Revocable Trust, their undivided one-half interest in the
property.

(TR 6) Kendrick and Lila McCracken appointed Mark

McCracken their true and lawful attorney-in-fact, (TR 2).

Mr.

McCracken said he had no authority to enter into a joint venture
only the written contract for sale and related documents. (TR 34)
The parties understood and intended that the Power of Attorney
authorized Mark McCracken

to act in the sale transaction for

Kendrick and Lila individually and also in their trustee
capacity. (TR 37-39, 52, 71-72, 75-77, 89, 91) Three of the
warranty deeds conveying the subdivision lots in August and
3

September of 1980 were executed by Mark McCracken as an attorneyin-fact for, among others, Kendrick and Lila McCracken as
trustees. (Exhibit 8)

Appellant Downs caused these warranty

deeds to be prepared by Western States Title Company and to be
subsequently recorded. (TR 92-94)

And on or about April 23,

1984, Kendrick McCracken and Lila McCracken individually and as
trustees of the Kendrick McCracken Family Revocable Trust deeded
to Mark McCracken all of their interest in the subject property
which deed was recorded on the 27th of April, 1984, in the
official records of the Cache County Recorders office. (Exhibt 7)
Mr. Downs and Mr. Greaves had engaged in the development of
the property into a residential subdivision and had gained
approval of a final plat of subdivision, which was approved by
the city of Smithfield, the first phase of said approved
subdivision plat recorded as a result of the efforts of himself
and Mr. Greaves, and at their request, in the official records of
the Cache County Recorders office on the 21st day of August 1980.
(TR 91-93)

Said subdivision had been officially approved on or

about the 28th day of November 1978 (Exhibit 4)

Mr. Downs

further acknowledged that he and Mr. Downs and Greaves executed
the owners dedication of the subdivision plat and requested Mr.
McCracken to execute the same individually and as attorney-in
fact for the other Sellers.

(TR 91-93).

After execution of the purchase agreement on the subject
property Mr. Downs and Mr. Greaves had full possession and use of
the property from and after the date of the purchase agreement
except for the permissive conditional use granted Mr. McCracken
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of farming the unused property until development was completed in
return for Mr. McCracken paying the annual irrigation water
assessments.
102)

(TR 32, 33, 56, 63, 64, 65, 68, 69, 85, 91, 94, 99,

The actual benefit over the years of such conditional use

was nominal. (TR 63-65).
After September of 1980, no significant development or
effort of any kind was made to complete the subdivision project
or sell the property. (TR 118) Mr. Downs had made some effort to
sell one additional lot but was unsuccessful and acknowledged
that he and Mr. Greaves had essentially

done nothing with the

project since that date because of the depressed real estate
economy. (TR 119)

No other moneys had been paid under the

contract to the McCrackens except as recited above.

(TR 120)

On January 15, 1981, Mr. Greaves, Mr. Downs, and Mr.
McCracken went to the office of Attorney Barrett.
Exhibit 11)

(TR 61, 106

There was some concern about the purchase agreement

because although it had been signed and recorded, The Buyers had
not delivered a note and trust deed to the Sellers, and Sellers
had not signed a deed or a trust deed and note to the Sellers.
(Exhibit 11)

All parties mutually agreed before Mr. Barrett

"that since the purchase agreement had been recorded and since
they were not in disagreement as to the amount that had been paid
to date (approximately $30,000.00 to McCracken) leaving a balance
of $149,500.00 due under the agreement, that they would just
leave things as they are." (Exhibit 11).
Mr. Mark McCracken made numerous inquiries of Appellants
during the subsequent three years from 1980 to September 1 of
1983 to determine the Appellants1 intentions of honoring the
5

contract.

(TR 26-30, 66, 67)

On at least one such occasion Mr.

Downs indicated that he had until September 1, 1983 to make any
payments, and that Mr. McCracken would simply have to wait and
see what took place.

(TR 66)

The remaining balance of

$149,500.00 was not paid on September 1, 1983 and has not since
been paid by the Appellants.

(TR 120)

As a consequence,

Respondent's brought this action for recovery of the balance due
and for a judgment requiring the Appellants to execute a standard
note and trust deed as contemplated under the terms of the
agreement for the recovery of the principal sum of $149,500.00
and further for an order authorizing the resale of the subject
real property and application of the proceeds from that sale
towards the outstanding judgment and a deficiency judgment
against Appellants should the sale of the property fail to
produce sufficient proceeds to satisfy Respondents1 claim. (TR 30)
The value of the remaining properly was at trial
approximately Seven Thousand Dollars ($7,000.00) per acre for a
total of $55,000.00 to $60,000.00.

(TR 65)

Mr. McCracken said he had no authority to enter into a joint
venture only the written contract for sale and related documents.
(TR 34).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Respondents have fully performed to the extent reasonably

possible, under the contract, and specific performance is an
appropriate remedy.
2.

Appellants have improperly attempted to use evidence not

presented at trial in support of their appeal.
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3.

Valid authority existed on the part of sellers to convey

the property under the agreement.
4.

The transaction and relationship between the parties was

one of a purchase and sale contract not a joint venture.
STATEMENT OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I
RESPONDENTS HAVE FULLY PERFORMED TO THE EXTENT
REASONABLY POSSIBLE UNDER THE CONTRACT,

AND

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE IS AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY.
It is undisputed that the trial court sitting without a jury
has jurisdiction to entertain equitable remedies.
Barnes 12 P 912 (Utah).

Allen v.

The facts clearly establish that the

parties intended to enter into

a purchase and sale contract.

The Sellers intended to sell the subject property and the Buyers
intended to purchase the same.
Appellants totally ignore the fact that a precondition to
Sellers' performance under the contract was Buyers' delivering
their note and trust deed to the Sellers.

There was certainly no

point in Sellers deeding the property to Buyers if that would
result in Sellers prejudicing or losing their security interest
in the property.

Certainly the Buyers had no reasonable

expectation of receiving a deed or title insurance to the
property absent delivery of the promissory note and trust deed.
Significantly, Buyers sustained no prejudice and if anything
obtained an advantage by their failure to deliver the note and
trust deed.

It is further significant that Buyers were the

principals who initiated the transaction, and took the lead in
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causing the documents to be prepared and established the
he
relationship with the title company in this matter.

(TR 71-76)

Appellant Downs testified that he knew who the owners of the
property were and knew the status of title.

(TR 71, 91) Indeed

no evidence was ever presented at trial to suggest that the
property was anything but free and clear since the date the
contract was initially executed.

Mr. McCracken testified that he

was the owner of the property and the property was clear of
liens. (TR 14-18, 49)

It is also significant that the parties

met in January of 1981 and acknowledged that the note, trust deed
and warranty deed and title insurance had not been exchanged and
all parties agreed that they would proceed under the existing
circumstances and that the contract balance then owing of
$149,000.00

would be paid in accordance of the contract i.e.

September 1, 1983. (TR 61, 106, Exhibit 11)
Under the circumstances the trial court had the option of
either awarding monetary damages i.e. $149,500.00 plus interest
from the due date of September 1, 1983, or alternatively ordering
an equitable remedy that would afford both parties the benefit of
their bargain and the protections contemplated under the contract
i.e. execution of the note and trust deed and forclosure of the
same.

The Court in its discretion elected the latter remedy.

Relief may be granted under circumstances where the party
requesting such relief has exercised reasonable efforts to
discharge his own obligation. See Bradford v. Alvey 8c Sons Utah
621 P2d 1240 (1980), see also Huck v^ Hanes Utah 560 P2d 1142.
The evidence is clear that Respondents, even after the
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meeting in 1981 with Attorney Barrett contacted Appellants on
several occasions inquiring of the Buyers' ability to perform
under the contract and make payment.

On each occasion Sellers

were assured that the contract would be honored, and on one
occasion, Mr. McCracken was informed by Mr. Downs that the
contract did not require payment until September 1, 1983, and he
would have to wait until then.

(TR 26-30, 66, 67) Respondents

acted responsibly and promptly under all of the circumstances.
Respondents caused no delay in the enforcement of the agreement
and caused no disadvantage to Appellants.

Indeed the cause of

action for which the trial court ultimately granted relief did
not arise until September 1, 1983, and could not under the terms
of the contract. (Exhibit 1)
POINT II
APPELLANT HAS IMPROPERLY ATTEMPTED TO USE EVIDENCE
NOT PRESENTED AT TRIAL IN SUPPORT OF THEIR APPEAL.
Appellants in their appeal brief suggest that the Court
erred in judgment, and alledge that title to the subject property
was at some time after the execution of the purchase and sale
contract encumbered by acts of Respondent.

In support of such

allegation, Appellants rely upon exhibits indentified as 13 and
14.

No such evidence, however, was ever introduced at trial and

exhibits 13 and 14 have never been received in any of these
proceedings, even after trial by the Court.

Appellants entire

argument suggesting wrong doing or adversely affecting the title
to property by Respondents, is without any merit and can not be
raised now having not been raised at trial.
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"Matters not presented to the trial court may not
be raised for the first time on appeal."
"The burden is on the parties to make certain that
the record they compile will adequately preserve their
arguments for review in the event of an appeal."
Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Company
659 P2d. 1040 (Utah 19517, see also Duckett v^ Qlsen 699
P2d. 734 (Utah 1985).
POINT III
VALID AUTHORITY EXISTED ON THE PART OF SELLERS TO
CONVEY THE PROPERTY UNDER THE AGREEMENT
Respondents agree with Appellants' statement that, generally
speaking, a trustees1 powers and duties can not be delegated to
others.

This does not mean, however, that ministerial duties,

such as executing documents for the sale of trust property, can
not be delegated to agents or attorneys.
Behrens, 252

As stated in Meek v

P. 91 (Wash), "It is undoubtedly the rule that,

while a Trustee may delegate to someone else a purely ministerial
duty, he may not delegate to another his discretionary powers.
The case of Dodge v. Stickney, 62 N.H. 330 (1882), is quoted
in 50 A.L.R., 214, 216 as follows:
"It is, however, permissible for a Trustee to
employ an agent to perform ministerial duties
connected with the execution of a trust. If a
Trustee can not in the exercise of due caution,
employ agents, and rely on their judgment and
honesty in the transaction of business matters
pertaining to the Trust, without being held
responsible for a successful issue in every
instance, many estates would remain unsettled for
want of sufficiently courageous Trustees. ... If
it is reasonably necessary for a Trustee to employ
agents or attorneys, and if he uses ordinary care
in their selection and proper supervision over
the business entrusted to them, he can not be held
liable for his discretion resulting without fault
on his part."
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In the instant action, Kendrick and Lila McCracken as
Trustees of the Kendrick and Lila McCracken Revocable Trust,
properly delegated their ministerial duty to Mark McCracken to
execute documents necessary for the sale of the property.
Kendrick and Lila

did not delegate any discretionary or

supervisory powers to Mark McCracken over the Trust.

Instead,

they made a decision to sell a portion of the trust property and
granted Mark McCracken power of attorney to complete the
transaction after their decision.
In addition, assuming arguendo that Kendrick and Lila did
not act as Trustees to sell trust property, any defect in the
sale was cured by the subsequent special warranty deed (Exhibit
7) executed by Kendrick and Lila as individuals and as trustees
to Mark McCracken.

As provided in Section 5 7-1-10, Utah Code

Annotated and recited below, such subsequent conveyance to Mark
McCracken has the effect of transfering any interest he obtained
thereby to ultimately Greaves and Downs as Purchasers of the
property under the recorded contract.
Section 57-1-6 Utah Code regarding the necessity of
recording notices of contract and interests in property, (which
incidentally Appellants took advantage of) provides:
"Neither the fact that an instrument, recorded as
herein provided, recites only a nominal consideration,
nor the fact that the Grantee in such instrument is
designated as Trustee, or that the conveyance otherwise
proports to be in trust without naming the
beneficiaries or stating the terms of the trust, shall
operate to charge any third person with notice of the
interest of any person or persons not named in such
instrument or of the Grantor or Grantors; but the
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Grantee may convey the fee or such lesser interest as
was conveyed to him by such instrument free and clear
of all claims not disclosed by the instrument or by an
instrument as recorded as herein provided setting forth
the names of the beneficiaries, specifying the interest
claimed and describing the property charged with such
interest."
Mr. Downs and Mr. McCracken both testified that it was Mr.
Downs who suggested that a Power of Attorney be obtained to
facilitate an expeditious closing of the transaction.
20, 71-74, 108, 112)

(TR 19,

Mr. Downs indicated that he knew that Lila

and Kendrick McCracken owned and held interest in the subject
property prior to entering into the contract, and he had
solicited and obtained the services of the title company to
assist him in completing the transaction and had reviewed this
information with Attorney Barrett. (TR 71-76)
"The demands of this section [57-1-6] are answered if a party
dealing with the land has information of a fact or
facts that would put a prudent man upon inquiry and
would, if pursued lead to actual knowledge of the state
of the title." See Toland v^ Corey Utah 24 P. 190.
Appellants are now estopped from asserting as an affirmative
defense lack of authority to proceed when they in fact failed to
exercise a prudent inquiry and had constructive notice of the
circumstances of title and elected to proceed with the
transaction.
Section 57-1-10 of the Utah Code provides as follows:
"If any person shall hereafter convey any real estate
by conveyance proporting to convey the same in fee
simple absolute, and shall not at the time of such
conveyance have the legal estate in such real estate,
but shall afterwards acquire the same, the legal estate
subsequently acquired shall immediately pass to the
Grantee, his heirs, successors or assigns, and such
conveyance shall be as valid as if such legal estate
had been in the Grantor at the time of the conveyance."
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The potential conflict of title created by Kendrick and Lila
McCracken' s Quit Claim Deed in trust of July 1978 is cured by the
subsequent special warranty deed (Exhibit 7) executed by Kendrick
and Lila McCracken as individuals and trustees to Mark McCracken.
The subsequent deed (Exhibit 7) itself evidences the original
intent of the McCrackens which was to sell the property under the
purchase agreement (Exhibit 1) and as a matter of equity,
Respondents would have been estopped from selling the property
contrary to the purchase agreement and the rights of the
Appellants.
POINT IV
THE TRANSACTION AND RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
PARTIES WAS ONE OF A PURCHASE AND SALE CONTRACT
NOT A JOINT VENTURE.
The Purchase Agreement identified as Exhibit 1 speaks for
itself.

The parties acknowledged that this is the only agreement

which they entered into, and although it was not fully performed
represents the contract they intended.

(TR 71-76, 88, Exhibit

11)
"A construction giving an instrument a legal effect to
accomplish its purpose will be adopted when it can
reasonably be done, and between two possible constructions
that will be adopted which establishes a valid contract.
Schofield v. Z.C.M.I. 39 P2d 342 also Driggs v. Utah
State 142 P2d 657.
The only reasonable interpretation of the document is that
it is, as it is entitled: a purchase agreement and not an
agreement of joint venture.

The document clearly indentities the

Respondents as "Sellers" and the Appellants as "Purchasers", and
"Buyers".

The document specifically provides that the "Buyers
13

are desirous of purchasing said property for development and
subdivision and Sellers are agreeable to sell the same."
Paragraph 1 of the agreement provides that the "Sellers agree to
purchase all of the property and that the Buyers agree to pay for
the property in installments."

Paragraph 2 of the agreement

provides that it was expressly understood and agreed that the
Buyers shall be the developers and subdividers and the Sellers
shall have no part in nor control over the subdivision or sale of
the lots.

The only possible suggestion of a joint venture is the

provisions of paragraph lc of the agreement, which states as
follows:
"Provided, further, that Buyers and Sellers agree that
the Buyers are preparing a preliminary Plat for
subdivision which will subdivide the property into
Twenty-seven (27) lots and that the buyers will sell
said lots at the best possible price. If, after all
the lots have been sold, more than a gross sales price
of Three hundred Sixty Thousand Dollars ($360,000.00),
less any real estate commissions, have been realized by
the Buyers, then Sellers shall receive as additional
compensation for the purchase and sale of their
property, one-half (1/2) of all of the proceeds from
the sale of said lots exceeding Three Hundred Sixty
Thousand Dollars ($360,000.00)."
Even these provisions, however, identify the parties as
"Buyers" and "Sellers" and specify that any additional funds from
the sale of property in excess of Three Hundred and Sixty
Thousand Dollars ($360,000.00) payable to the Sellers was to be
identified "as additional compensation for the purchase and sale
of their property."
Mark McCracken testified at trial that subparagraph "c" was
included in the contract as consideration for the fact that no
interest was charged for the five year term of payment of the
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agreed contract price, and further that such an allowance was
given as an accommodation to the purchasers to encourage a
successful development and sale of the property and further in
anticipation of property value increase and thereby obtaining a
higher compensation for the purchase and sale of the property.
(TR 23)
The evidence is clear that both parties relied upon the
contract and therefore are entitled to enforcement of the same.
Appellants caused the contract to be acknowledged by a notary
public in proper form and recorded and thereby asserted their
claim in and to the subject property and have established a lien
and recorded claim of interest against and to the property to the
present time.

Section 5 7-1-6 of the Utah Code provides:

"every instrument in writing setting forth an agreement
to convey any real estate or whereby any real estate can
be affected, to operate as notice to third person shall
be proved or acknowledged and certified in the manner
prescribed by this title and recorded in the office of
the county in which the real estate is situated, but
shall be valid and binding between the parties thereto
without such proofs acknowledgment, certification of
record, and as to all other persons who have had actual
notice."
That the parties continued to treat the transaction as a
purchase and sale of the property is further evidenced by
Attorney Barrett's testimony and his memo to his Greaves and
Downs file (Exhibit 11). As stated in paragraph 2 of Attorney
Barrett1 s memo, the parties had "mutually

agreed" that they were

not in disagreement as to the provisions of the agreement or
their actions thereunder and that they could proceed under the
Purchase Agreement.

The parties also were in agreement as to the

remaining balance due under the agreement being $149,500.00.
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(emphasis added) It must be concluded there would be no "balance
due under the agreement"
anything

if the agreement were treated as

other than a purchase and sale of the property.

There

would be no balance due under a joint venture.
Attorney Barrett1s memo also indicates that the parties
preferred to "leave the situation as it is and not to have any
deeds exchange hands yetl (emphasis added)

It is quite apparent

that the parties intended to transfer deeds as contemplated in
the Purchase Agreement but that the transfer could take place at
a later date.

This further indicates that the parties continued

to treat the transaction as a purchase and sale of the property
even more than two years after signing the agreement.
At no time did any of the parties contemplate their
transaction to be a joint venture agreement or anything other
than a purchase agreement. (TR 88) Mr. McCracken testified that
he had no authority to enter into a joint venture, only a sale
contract (TR 34) The following considerations evidence that no
joint venture was contemplated:
(a) The agreement was not for the purpose of
making joint profit.

The payments received by McCrackens

from the sale of property were, as stated in the
Purchase Agreement, payments on the purchase price and
were made in a manner consistent with the contract.
Once Respondents had received the purchase price of the
property, Appellants would receive all remaining proceeds
from the sale of remaining lots.
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(b)

There was no combination of property, money,

affects, skill, labor nor knowledge.

Respondents merely

sold the property to Appellants. The Appellants were
to subdivide the property, obtain subdivision plats and
make any improvements to the property and to obtain
Purchasers for the property.

Additionally, it was

Appellants who held themselves out as developers and
approached Respondents for the purpose of purchasing
their property. They did not request Respondents to join
them in any common venture.
(c) Although both parties had an interest in
seeing that the subdivision was successful and in
selling lots from the subdivision, the interest of
Appellants and Respondents was very different and
conflicting.

Respondents hoped that the lots would be

sold in order to receive the purchase price of the
property, but other than that, Respondents anticipated
receiving the purchase price for the property whether
or not the Appellants sold the lots.

Respondents did

not join with Appellants in actually subdividing the property
and did not in any way participate in obtaining
purchasers for the lots.

As such, there was no

community of interest or common purpose.
(d)

There was also no joint propriety interest in

the subject matter, i.e. property.

Mark McCracken

signed the deeds to Progressive Homes and signed the
subdivision plat only as a convenience and not in exercising
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any joint venture control over the property. Respondents obtaine<
permission from Appellants to farm the property but had no
right in directing the improvements, divisions, or sales of
the property.
(e)

Respondents had no right to control or share

in the profits nor was there any obligation to share in
losses.

As stated above, once Respondents received

the purchase price of the property it was Appellants
who would receive all profits from the sale of lots.
Appellants were still obligated to pay the purchase
price of the property whether or not lots were ever
sold.
Ironically if Mr. Mccracken had no authority as suggested in
Appellant1s brief, then he had no authority to enter into a joint
venture either.

Clearly the only authority given Mark McCracken

was to enter into the sale contract, and to execute documents
necessary to accomplish its purposes.
CONCLUSION
Appellants have received the entire benefit of the contract.
Respondents have been prejudiced and damaged.

Appellants are

attempting to reneg soley because the present economic conditions
make it difficult to sell the property purchased for profit.

The

economies of subdivision development, however, is of little
importance to the legal and equitable issues of the case.

The

risk of subdivision development was a burden borne solely by
Appellants.

The trial court appropriately entered findings

consistent with the evidence presented and a judgment consistent
with law and equity.

Where there is substantial evidence in the
18

record to support the trial court1s decision, that judgment
should not be disturbed on appeal.
405 (Utah).

(see Edgar v. Wagner 5 72 P2d.

The judgment should be affirmed.

DATED this

/

day of May, 1986.
JENKINS, McKEAN_& ASSOCIATES
/

V

Jame"s C. Jenkins
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was mailed to George Preston, Attorney at Law, 67 East
100 North, P.O. box 3 700, Logan, Utah, 84321, by depositing the
same with the U.S. mail postage prepaid and addressed as stated
this

^ ~/f

day of May, 1986.
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ADDENDUM
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57-1-6. Recording necessary to impart notice—Operation and effect—
Interest of person not named in instrument.—Every conveyance of real
estate, and every instrument of writing setting forth an agreement to
convey any real estate or whereby any real estate may be affected, to
operate as notice to third persons shall be proved or acknowledged and
certified in the manner prescribed by this title and recorded in the office of
the recorder of the county in which such real estate is situated, but shall be
valid and binding between the parties thereto without such proofs, acknowledgment, certification or record, and as to all other persons who have had
actual notice. Neither the fact that an instrument, recorded as herein
provided, recites only a nominal consideration, nor the fact that the grantee
in such instrument is designated as trustee, or that the conveyance otherwise purports to be in trust without naming the beneficiaries or stating the
terms of the trust, shall operate to charge any third person with notice of
the interest of any person or persons not named in such instrument or of
the grantor or grantors; but the grantee may convey the fee or such lesser
interest as was conveyed to him by such instrument free and clear of all
claims not disclosed by the instrument or by an instrument recorded as
herein provided setting forth the names of the beneficiaries, specifying the
interest claimed and describing the property charged with such interest.

57-1-10. After-acquired title passes.—Tf any person shall hereafter
••.mvev any real estate by conveyance purporting to convey the same in
f*»e simple absolute, and shall not at the time of such conveyance have the
legal estate in such real estate, but shall afterwards acquire the same,
the legal estate subsequently acquired shall immediately pass to the grantee,
his heirs, successors or assigns, and such conveyance shall be as valid as if
such W a l estate had been in the grantor at the time of the conveyance.
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PURCHASE AGREEMENT

THIS AGREEMENT Bade and entered into this
Octohct~%

J9^

day of

1978* by and between JERRI DOWNS and JERALD CREATES,

hereinafter referred to as Purchasers and MARK McCRACXEN, on behalf of himself and as attorney in fact for KEDRICt McCRACIEN and
LILA P# McCRACKEN, husband and wife, and DORIS B. McCRACKEN, hereinafter collectirely referred to as Sellers, is made with reference
to the following faots:
WHEREAS, Sellers are the owners of certain real property in the
City of Salthfield, County of Cache, State of Utah, consisting of
9*57 acres, more or less, a more particular description of which
Is attached hereto and Incorporated herein as Exhibit "A*, and
WHEREAS, Buyers are desirous of purchasing said property for
derelopnent and subdivision and Sellers are agreeable to selling the
same* '
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereto agree as follows:
1»

Sellers agree to sell and Buyers agree to purchase all

of the property described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto, consisting
of 9.57 acres more or less, in the City of Salthfield, County of
Cache, State of Utah, and Buyers agree to pay for said described
property the amounts, in installments as follows:
m.

As a downpayment, Buyers agree to pay to Sellers con-

temporaneous with the execution of this Agreement, the sum of
Fire Hundred Dollars ($500«00), receipt of which is acknowledged
by the Sellers*
b*

Buyers agree to pay an additional One Hundred Seventy-

nine Thousand, Fire Hundred Dollars ($179,500*00) in the form
of a Note secured by a Deed of Trust on the described property.
Said Note shall be payable in full on the First of September,. 1983•
Provided, however, that, whenever Buyers shall sell a lot or
portion of the described property, they shall pay one-half of
the gross sale price less real estate commissions, if any, of

I
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said lot to Sellers to apply on said Mote.
o.

Provided, further9 that Buyers and Sellers agree

that the Buyers are preparing a preliminary plat for subdivision which will subdivide the property into twenty-seven (27)
lots and that Buyers will sell said lots at the best available
price.

If, after all of the lots have been sold, more than a

gross sales price of Three Hundred and Sixty Thousand dollars
(1360,000.00), less any real estate commissionst has been realised
by the Buyers, then Sellers shall receive as additional compensation for the purchase and sale of their property, one-half (1/2)
of all of the proceeds from the sale of said lots exceeding
$360,000.00.
2*

It is further understood and agreed that the Buyers

shall be the developers and subdivlders and that Sellers shall have
no part in nor control over the subdivision or sale of the said
lots.
3.

Closing of this Agreement by Sellers deeding the

subject property to the Buyers and Buyers delivering their Mote
and Deed of Trust to the Sellers shall be on or before November 20,
1978, at the sole election of the Sellers.
k.

It is agreed that this entire Agreement is contingent

upon approval of a final plat of subdivision being approved by the
City of Smlthfleld. .In the event said plat is not approved for any
reason within one year from the date of this Agreement, then the
Buyers, at their option, may reelnd the agreement by deeding the
described property back to the Sellers in return for the Promissory
Vote.

In such event, the Sellers shall retain the Plve Hundred Dollar

(I500.00X downpayment.
5*

It is understood and agreed that Buyers shall pay

mil subdivision and development costs, including real estate taxes
after the calendar year 1978. Sellers shall pay the 1978 real
property taxes assessed against the subject property.
6.

Sellers agree to provide to Buyers a policy of title

Insurance at Sellers9 expense within ninety (90) days after the

239 mm
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PURCHASE AGREEMENT
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execution of this Agreement*
7*

As Buyers sell any lot or lots, the Seller agrees to

execute and dellrer to the designated title company a reconreyanoe
from the Deed of Trust on any such lots, releasing said lots from the
lien of the Deed of Trust,
8. This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement of
the parties hereto and no amendments or changes may he made except
In writing, executed by the party to be charged,
9. This Agreement shall be binding upon the heirs, executors, successors and assigns of the parties hereto*
DATED this

/<?&

day of

, 1978.

DC^A/JA^

BOXERS:

SELLERS:

Mark McCracken
On behalf of himself and as
Attorney in Fact for:
ledrick McCracken and
Lila P. McCracken, husband
and wife, and
Doris E« McCracken

STATE OP UTAH

)

County of Cache)
On this

/ftj

BSm

day of Ottob**

, 1978, personally appeared

before me JERRI DOVHS, JERALD GREAVES and MARC McCRAKEN, the
signers of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me
that temp executed the same,

^

.•":*.*

(rotary Public
Commission expires: May/y/f/Z
Residing in

/<ya>r/

CaUid***^*

UQK
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V.
Beginning at the Vest side of street, 11.75 chains South
of a point 14*50 chains East of the Northwest Corner of Lot 5,
Block 2, Plat "C" Saithfleld City Survey, and running thence
Vest, 10.0 chains; thence South, 2.0 chains; thence East 10.0
chains, a/1, to the Vest side of said street; thence North,
2.0 chains along the Vest side of said street, to the point of
beginning- Containing 2.0 acres, a/1. ,.-••.. *
ni-tfo~oez***
Beginning at a point on the Vest side of street, 13*75
chains South of a point 14.5 chains East of the Northwest
Corner of Lot 5, Block 2, Flat »C* Saithfleld City Survey,
Vest 10 chains; South, 8 chains; East 10 chains; North, 6
chains to beginnln*.
Containing 7.57 acres. . _
•

w
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